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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHY ROE WON’T GO

MICHAEL S. GREVE*

INTRODUCTION
I am quite fond of jurisdictional and choice-of-law issues, and I cannot
think of a more judicious and sure-footed guide through this terrain than
Richard Fallon. I shall not quarrel with Professor Fallon’s legal analysis of his
hypotheticals on the retroactive application of pre-Roe1 abortion statutes or on
the extraterritorial application of post-Roe state laws (the gravamen of
Professor Fallon’s article2 and argument). The real difficulty with Professor
Fallon’s essay, it seems to me, lies elsewhere: ultimately, the argument lacks
the moral seriousness that befits this sordid subject.
I. NO WAY
I begin with a confident prediction: Roe will not be overturned any time
soon. That is not simply a matter of judicial “vote counting”; even an
additional anti-Roe vote on the Supreme Court would not materially change
my prediction. The reason is that Justices do what Richard Fallon asks us to
do here: they try to envision the consequences of their decisions, especially on
matters of such gravity. The most certain consequence of overruling Roe
would be a massive political upheaval. On one side, the Republican Party
would face terrible difficulties in maintaining its electoral coalition, at least
through one or two election cycles. On the other side, overturning Roe might
do what even Bush v. Gore3 failed to do—sour the legal establishment on the
Court.
The weight of these considerations in the judicial calculus is a matter of
conjecture. Perhaps, the Justices do not care much about election outcomes
(although by some accounts, past abortion decisions have been “timed” for

* John G. Searle scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Director of AEI’s Federalism Project.
Ph.D., Cornell University.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a PostRoe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611 (2007).
3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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elections).4 Perhaps, they ignore the clamor and chatter at the Harvard Law
School and its New York Times satellite offices.5 And perhaps, the legal
establishment would digest the demise of Roe v. Wade at the same speed with
which it seems to have digested Bush v. Gore—as a shocking betrayal that
leaves a very bad aftertaste but ultimately, not a sufficiently compelling reason
to revisit the institutional commitment to an imperial Court. Against these
“perhapses,” however, stands the fact that the Justices care very much about
their own future places in history and, moreover, about the Court’s institutional
prestige and reputation. These in turn depend on a political base that will
defend the Court as an institution.6 Under current and reasonably foreseeable
conditions, that base cannot be the Federalist Society, and it cannot be the law
schools. Rather, the Court’s political base is an eclectic, ideologically diverse
mix of court-centered activists and interest groups—all of them dismayed (for
widely varying reasons) with what the Court has done, but all of them hoping
that the Court may yet come to see the light on “their” issues.
Having staked its institutional prestige on Roe and its progeny, the Court
will be hard-pressed to find a face-saving exit. A dramatic, outright reversal of
Roe might easily prompt a potent institutional attack from the losing side. If I
am right about its likely electoral consequences, it might even cause very bad
blood all around. It is, in all events, not calculated to help the Court
institutionally.
I will briefly return to this point at the end of my remarks. My initial
observation is this: for a Court that wants to get out of “the abortion-umpiring
business,”7 or even for a Court that does not give a rip about abortion per se
but simply looks to its own institutional interests, the optimal strategy is to
eviscerate Roe piecemeal, one restriction at a time. The conceptual framework
of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey8 leaves ample

4. David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 509, 583 (2001).
5. However, Judge Larry Silberman some years ago famously attributed the Supreme
Court’s solicitude of elite opinion to a “Greenhouse Effect,” as in Linda Greenhouse of The New
York Times. Judge Laurence Silberman, Judicial Activism: The Press Pulls the Strings, Speech
Before the Federalist Society in Washington, D.C. (June 13, 1992), in TEX. LAW., June 29, 1992,
at 15. Greenhouse herself has been very candid about her views on intensely controversial
constitutional issues, including abortion. Linda Greenhouse, A Bridge Over Troubled Water:
2006 Radcliff Institute Medal Acceptance Speech (June 10, 2006), available at
http://www.radcliffe.edu/alumnae/ reunions/4and9/greenhouse.php.
6. The contention that the Supreme Court (like any other political institution) needs a base
of support is a central point of ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (4th
ed. 2005). See also Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court from Early Burger to Early Rehnquist, in
THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 47 (Anthony King ed., 2d ed. 1990).
7. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
8. 505 U.S. 833.
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room for that strategy. Depending on the future appointments, Justice
Kennedy’s calculations about his legacy, and the sequencing of abortion cases,
the Supreme Court may well use that maneuvering room. That way, if Roe
were eventually repealed, it would no longer matter very much.
II. SUBSTANCE AND JURISDICTION
The considerations just sketched, I admit, are somewhat unfair to Richard
Fallon. “Ain’t gonna happen” is not a compelling response—it is no response
at all—to the proposition that Roe might be overturned, which is the
speculation Professor Fallon asks us to entertain.9 Moreover, a gradual
evisceration of Roe could pose many of the difficulties he discusses. If a
wholesale abortion prohibition can be enforced extraterritorially, then so can a
partial one. So what of it?
Professor Fallon’s central thesis—that the Supreme Court could not get out
of the “abortion-umpiring business”10 even if it wanted to, at least not by
means of overruling Roe11—depends in some sense on what exactly one means
by “umpiring.” What Justice Scalia meant by that phrase (contained in an
impassioned opinion)12 is that the Court should abandon the attempt to define
the contours of an extra-textual constitutional right. He has consistently
maintained that the Court is ill-equipped to serve as the nation’s moral
guardian—among other reasons, because the attempt to umpire a culture war
eventually forces the Court to choose sides.13 I do not believe, however, that
Justice Scalia then wrote or now labors under the impression that a reversal of
Roe would spell an automatic end to all cases involving abortion in some way
or another. If the Supreme Court were to surrender its monopoly over the
definition of abortion rights, those rights would be defined elsewhere,
predominantly (though perhaps not exclusively) in the states. As Professor
Fallon observes, the substitution of a uniform right with a federal,
decentralized arrangement necessitates a determination of exactly which state
gets to decide what and for whom.14 State laws on abortion, as on all other
matters, may pose difficult problems of jurisdiction, choice of law, and the

9. See generally Fallon, supra note 2.
10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
11. Fallon, supra note 2, at 612–14.
12. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
13. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When the Court
takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins—and more
specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the
Court’s Members are drawn.”).
14. Fallon, supra note 2, at 633–36.
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like. Surely, Justice Scalia understands that point. (He used to teach Conflicts
of Law.15)
The question is whether there is a meaningful difference between the direct
judicial determination of abortion rights and the adjudication of jurisdictional
questions that arise over politically and statutorily determined abortion rights.
On that score, it seems to me that there is all the difference in the world
between an abortion case and an abortion-related case on, say, the choice of
law; between the umpiring of abortion and a second-order determination of
which state gets to decide what with respect to abortion. A few examples
illustrate the difference.
Commerce Clause16 decisions are jurisdictional decisions. The scope of
the Commerce Clause determines which jurisdiction, state or federal, gets to
decide what. Under the post-New Deal understanding, any economic
transaction is ipso facto “interstate commerce,” and so the modern Commerce
Clause decisions have involved controversial social issues with a highly
attenuated economic nexus: guns in schools, violence against women, illegal
drugs. Yet few, I trust, would contend that the Supreme Court was “umpiring”
those issues in Lopez,17 Morrison,18 or Raich.19 Raich was no more pro-”War
on Drugs” than Lopez was pro-guns in schools or than Morrison was pro-gang
rape. The Justices can easily tell the difference between substance and
jurisdiction, and so can the public.
Judicial decisions concerning gay rights and especially same-sex marriage
illustrate the same point. State court decisions that directly umpire those
matters—”homosexual marriage, yea or nay”—are invariably the stuff of
national press coverage. Second-order jurisdictional controversies have largely
failed to attract comparable coverage, though not for lack of occasion.
Because gay marriage involves a complicated web of ongoing relations rather
than a one-shot act, it poses far more, and far more difficult, jurisdictional and
choice-of-law questions than would abortion. For example, the highest courts
of Vermont and Virginia have become embroiled in a nasty dispute over
custody rights arising from one of Vermont’s “civil unions.” (Is Virginia
compelled to recognize Vermont law in that dispute? Is Vermont in turn
compelled to respect Virginia’s emphatic “no” to that question? Who gets to

15. See Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographies
current.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
17. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (addressing guns in schools).
18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (addressing violence against women).
19. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (addressing medical marijuana).
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keep the child?)20 Vermont was the first civil union state;21 Virginia sports the
most draconian anti-gay marriage constitution in the country.22 Evidently, the
citizens of those states take marriage laws seriously. And yet, the vexing
custody case, which puts the laws of both states to the test, has attracted no
public notice, let alone commotion.
Jurisdictional cases may simply be too complicated for newspaper
headlines and public consumption. But that only goes to show that at some
level, the complications matter. They dampen feverish public agitation, and
they independently affect the case outcomes. In jurisdictional or choice-of-law
cases, one can actually imagine Justices and judges taking “positions” at
variance with their underlying substantive preferences. As Justice Scalia might
say, the presence of a jurisdictional issue forces the Court to act as an actual
court of law, instead of simply “choosing sides” in a law-free environment.
Richard Fallon suggests that there is no getting away from the substance.
For example, the adjudication of jurisdictional cases might still compel the
Court to make a determination with respect to the strength of the state’s
interest in regulating abortion.23 Perhaps so. I will even grant a concession
that Professor Fallon does not invite: judicial preferences on abortion rights
may be sufficiently intense to affect the determination of second-order
questions. It is perfectly plausible to argue that the Roe Court hand-tailored
doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness to fit the abortion context,24 and
that the post-Roe Court created a kind of second-class free speech status for
abortion protesters.25 If Roe were overturned, something of the sort might
come to pass in abortion-related cases on jurisdiction and choice of law. But if
abortion rights have a gravitational pull, then so does the rest of the legal
universe. Rules of general applicability are not easily tailored to individual
issues, and even the most results-oriented judge will have to consider how a
rule that produces the “right” abortion result would play out in a different
context, in the hands of different judges.

20. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006); Miller-Jenkins v. MillerJenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); see also Alan J. Keays, Civil-Union Custody
Suit Back in Rutland Court, RUTLAND HERALD, Nov. 16, 2006, at A1.
21. See Ellen Barry, Eagerness and Some Resignation as Civil Union Law Takes Effect,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at B1.
22. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (effective Jan. 1, 2007).
23. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 634–36.
24. See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REV. 603, 623–24 (1992).
25. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 785, 791–92, 803–04, 814 (1994)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court
created a special First Amendment standard for abortion-related case).
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III. LITIGATION DYNAMICS
Presumably, Richard Fallon intends his Article as more than a moot court
exercise. If so, his examples should have some practical plausibility. In my
judgment, they lack that plausibility. Instead, Professor Fallon’s scenarios
assume a cascade of increasingly unlikely events.26
First off, and most trivially, the Supreme Court does not have to hear any
abortion-related case. It can simply deny certiorari. One would assume that a
Court that has (by stipulation) taken abortion off its agenda would resist
litigants’ attempts to force that subject back on to the docket. Thus, something
or somebody would practically have to force the Court’s hand.
A series of circuit splits, accompanied by public clamor over the Court’s
failure to address the matter, might fit that bill. That scenario, however,
supposes that Fallon-style cases arise with some regularity. And that, in turn,
supposes that voters, their state representatives, and public prosecutors will, in
a post-Roe era, do extreme things—very extreme things, with sufficient
regularity to produce a steady stream of litigation. That seems exceedingly
unlikely.
Imagine, if you will (and as Richard Fallon asks you to) a state that is
completely dominated by the most extreme contingent of the anti-abortion
movement.27 No such state exists, but for the sake of Professor Fallon’s
argument, I shall follow him and call it Utah. Bear in mind that Professor
Fallon’s scenarios presuppose a large supply of abortion-related cases, from
several Circuits—meaning that a single Utah will not do. Let us therefore
envision a dozen Utahs, where rabid Right-to-Lifers get what they want: what
will it be? Professor Fallon presents several dire possibilities. None of them
are remotely plausible.
Professor Fallon envisions prohibitory abortion statutes that make no
exception for the health or even the life of the mother. I doubt that any such
statute would see the light of day. If it did, it would not survive the death of a
single woman, let alone the inevitable onslaught by the plaintiffs’ bar.
Individual misfortunes with life-saving prescription drugs and vaccines
routinely produce liability litigation and shrill denunciations of the producer’s
and the government’s callousness. An abortion statute that compelled the
medical profession to tolerate serious injury or even death for women would
soon be repealed.

26. I cannot discuss all of Professor Fallon’s hypotheticals. My discussion is limited to the
scenarios that occupy a large amount of space in his analysis. I do not discuss Professor Fallon’s
potential First Amendment problems, see Fallon, supra note 2, at 640–46, which, in an Internet
age, can arise and have arisen over any number of morally freighted practices that are legal in
some states but illegal in others. The only question is whether we should have special rules for
abortion-related speech, to which the answer is “no.”
27. Fallon, supra note 2, at 628.
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Professor Fallon also envisions the retroactive enforcement of antiabortion statutes,28 as well as the enactment of extraterritorial criminal statutes,
against women who have procured abortions.29 No serious right-to-life group,
advocate, or institution proposes or even condones any such policy. (At least
one pro-life institution vehemently opposes such a policy: the Catholic
Church.)30 Professor Fallon’s scenarios, then, must apply to the much
narrower class of abortion providers, rather than consumers. Even within this
small class, however, the prospects of retroactive state enforcement and of
extraterritorial legislation and enforcement seem very slim. The states that are
most likely to enforce pre-Roe statutes will have little occasion to do so. Even
now, the Utahs of this nation have only one or two abortion providers, and a
few years hence the number may well be zero.31
The prospect of a Utah law banning abortions and the prosecution of a
California doctor for performing an abortion on a Utah citizen in California32
strikes me as even more far-fetched. Even supposing that such a law were
enacted, who would enforce it and how? Public prosecutors have no ready
way of knowing who has left the state and for what reasons. Perhaps, private
informants—akin to whistleblowers or environmental citizen plaintiffs—could
remedy that problem. We now have to presume, however, that Utah citizens
will not only vote for the law but will then assist in enforcing it—for example,
by reporting to the authorities their next-door teenager’s suspicious weekend
trip to an unknown destination, possibly California. The authorities would
then have to investigate whether the trip was (a) to California and (b) to an
abortion clinic rather than Disneyland. The authorities, moreover, would have
to pay those exorbitant detection and enforcement costs with sufficient
frequency to allow some organization to find a test case—nay, scores of test
cases, including at least one in which the authorities do not simply drop the
prosecution to defeat the legal challenge.
To say that the scenario calls for speculation is to put it mildly. It calls for
absurdity.

28. Id. at 616–21.
29. Id. at 627–36.
30. Sister Paula Vandegaer, LCSW, After the Abortion, http://www.usccb.org/prolife/
programs/rlp/99rlvand.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
31. See Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, The Accessibility of Abortion Services
in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 16 (2003) (“Measures of
availability have generally declined since 1982: The number of abortion providers in the United
States has fallen by 37%, and the proportion of women living in counties with no abortion
provider has increased from 28% to 34%.”).
32. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 634.
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IV. ANALOGIES
I have tried to think of historical parallels to a Roe reversal, on the theory
that analogies might shed light where speculation easily leads astray. The most
obvious and current analogy is gay rights, specifically gay marriage.
Certainly, the comparison is imperfect, as the Supreme Court has so far
declined to establish a uniform rule (from which it might then have to retreat).
However, the fear that the Supreme Court might take that step has prompted a
great deal of political action in the states, with widely differing results. Many
states have enshrined prohibitions against same-sex marriages in their
constitutions, while others have proceeded to legitimize marriage-style
arrangements for same-sex couples, typically with the helpful assistance of
state courts. As noted earlier, state-to-state variation poses far more regular
and vexing jurisdictional and choice-of-law problems in this context than are
likely to arise in the abortion context. So far, however, the state-by-state
sorting process appears to work tolerably well. Whatever costs and
inconveniences may flow from decentralized decision-making in this context,
they pale against the costs of a constitutional amendment for or against samesex marriage, under Article V33 or the Supreme Court’s steam.34
A second analogy is the end of Prohibition. Here again, there are
differences. Most obviously, Prohibition was both enshrined35 and then
repealed through an actual constitutional amendment,36 rather than judicial
edict. Still, the parallels between Richard Fallon’s hypothetical Roe reversal
and the repeal of the Twenty-First Amendment are striking. Here as there, the
issue is the repeal of an earlier constitutional amendment. Here as there, the
repeal would allow the states to go their separate ways. Here as there, the
decision would involve a central issue of social conflict or, if you will, of the
culture war. In both cases, the central question is whether the underlying
product is sinful or ordinary. “Demon rum” or just another consumer good?
The destruction of innocent life, or just another medical procedure?
The end of Prohibition posed all of the problems Professor Fallon
envisions, except more so. It meant that alcohol would be sold, shipped, and
advertised as a consumer product, and thousands of legal cases arose over the
implications. Questions of retroactive enforcement took on particular urgency,
as thousands of prosecutions over past violations were still pending at the

33. U.S. CONST. art. V.
34. See Michael S. Greve, Same Sex Marriage: Commit It to the States, FEDERALIST
OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Res., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2004, available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040310_No.20_16486graphics.pdf.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is hereby repealed.”).
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time.37 The cases hit the courts at a time when the Supreme Court exercised
much less discretion than it does now over its docket. Questions arose over the
scope of both federal and state authority, and they arose at a time when the
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence was undergoing a dramatic
change for reasons unrelated to alcohol regulation.
Despite all of this, the questions proved easily manageable. The Supreme
Court did entertain a number of relevant cases in the 1930s, many of them over
the question of whether the Twenty-First Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon
Act immunized state statutes that would otherwise violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause.38 The Court’s answer was to let the states have their way.
And with respect to violations of Prohibition-era federal statutes, the Court
declared that the Twenty-First Amendment rendered the National Prohibition
Act inoperative, cutting off all pending prosecutions under it.39 As near as one
can tell, no serious political constituency mistook the Court’s jurisdictional
determinations for verdicts on prohibition per se. The constitutional rule
having been repealed, the Court got out of the alcohol “umpiring” business,
and by the 1940s, cases related to alcohol regulation practically disappeared
from the Court’s docket. It was another six decades before the Court seriously
re-examined the question—when it was safe to do so, and under very different
economic, technological, and social conditions.40
V. THE ECOLOGY OF ABORTION
I fear that neither of my sanguine analogies will persuade Richard Fallon.
Abortion, he might say (and did say, in the course of this colloquium) is more
akin to slavery than to Prohibition or gay marriage. It is a dispute as to who
counts as a person, and in that contest, no quarter may be given. If abortion is
like slavery (or worse), how can one trust in jurisdictional sorting? Why
would people who believe that abortion is murder stop at state borders? The
opponents of Dred Scott did not stop at the borders; why should the opponents
of Roe?
At the bottom of Richard Fallon’s worry lies a deep distrust of antiabortion constituencies (or at least, the organized constituencies). Let the
Supreme Court repeal Roe, Professor Fallon imagines, and those constituencies
37. Don H. McLucas, Note, Some Legal Aspects of the Repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment,
28 U. ILL. L. REV. 950, 956 n.34 (1934).
38. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305
U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Mich., 305 U.S. 391
(1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938); State Bd. of Equalization of Cal.
v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936); McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131 (1932).
39. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222–23 (1934).
40. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (finding that the Twenty-First Amendment and
the Webb-Kenyon Act did not immunize discriminatory state alcohol regulation against Dormant
Commerce Clause challenge).
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will push to enact their extremist, punitive, vengeful agenda. And in many
states, they will succeed. Remove that factual premise, and none of Professor
Fallon’s scenarios makes sense.
There are in fact people who believe, and institutions that teach, that
abortion is the killing of innocent human life. Contrary to Professor Fallon’s
supposition, however, very few of those people and institutions believe that
abortion is principally a law enforcement issue—a social problem that could be
addressed by jailing tens of thousands of aborting women or by having public
prosecutors troll after out-of-state abortion providers. The vast majority of
right-to-life advocates have a rather more nuanced view of the matter. For
example, they are inclined to think of women who have made that tragic
choice as victims rather than perps. The Catholic Church, by all accounts an
organizational mainstay of the right-to-life movement, runs clinics and crisis
centers for expectant mothers—and for women who have had abortions.41
Perhaps, this is a clever public relations ploy and a concession to the spirit of
the times. But perhaps, the Church thinks that it is in the business of
redeeming lives, as opposed to destroying them. And perhaps, that quaint
belief would survive a repeal of Roe.
Richard Fallon’s inordinate fear of committing abortion to democratic
politics is anything but idiosyncratic. Precisely the same fear drives the
modern Supreme Court: remove the judiciary’s careful superintendence of the
nation’s moral and social life, the Justices apprehend, and Hark! What mayhem
follows.42 Roe and its progeny are the most pristine exemplar. In 1973, when
it effectively legislated a model abortion statute for all fifty states, the Supreme
Court sought to envision—and hasten—a progressive future, just as it had done
so nobly and successfully in Brown v. Board of Education.43 Surely, the
country would come to see the Court’s wisdom. Surely, Roe would do to
right-to-life constituencies what Brown and its progeny had done to racists—
decimate their ranks, and de-legitimize them as a force in American politics.
When that did not come to pass, members of the Court sternly warned
dissident citizens that they would be “tested by following.”44 That exhortation
seems to have gone unheeded. The ornery American people, including
especially its right-to-life constituencies, insist on making their own moral
judgments. Those groups understand perfectly well that abortion leaves most
of their fellow citizens deeply conflicted and ambivalent. They likewise
understand that abortion is not (to repeat) foremost a law enforcement issue but
41. See Alpha Health Services, Alpha Center: Services, http://www.alphacenter.org/services/
abortionrecovery.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Hope After Abortion, http://www.hopeafter
abortion.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Project Rachel Outreach, http://www.usccb.org/
prolife/issues/postabortion/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
42. ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 3–9 (2001).
43. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27–29 (1975).
44. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
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a fight for the hearts and minds of the American people. Citizens who oppose
abortion are perfectly prepared to wage that fight through persuasion, patiently
and peacefully. They do ask, however, that they be permitted to do so without
being told by the United States Supreme Court that their position is illegitimate
and beyond the bounds of democratic debate.45
A repeal of Roe, Richard Fallon writes in what almost looks like a coda to
his long and in many ways instructive discussion of post-Roe problems, could
not be easily cabined. It would likely have a large “butterfly effect.”46 The
observation is correct, but the animal metaphor is off. Roe is not a butterfly
but a turtle—the turtle on which the Supreme Court’s universe has come to
rest. In some sense, it is true after all that the Supreme Court cannot easily
leave the abortion-umpiring business. The reason, however, is not that the
abortion problem would promptly return in a jurisdictional garb. The reason is
that the umpiring of the nation’s mores has come to be the Court’s principal
business. It has come to define the Court’s institutional role and, more
fatefully, public and political perceptions of that role. A repeal of Roe would
amount to an admission that the modern Court’s project has been profoundly
ill-advised from the start. That, to my mind, is the correct view. But it is not
an insight that will come easily to the Court.

45. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority’s reading of Casey implies that citizens may not express their sentiments on abortion
through state legislation).
46. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 652.
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